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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant Brigham City filed this appeal from an interlocutory order of the First
District Court, Brigham City Department granting Defendants' ("Appellees'") Motion to
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Suppress Evidence. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to U.C.A. Sec.
78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 2001) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE FOR REVIEW
ISSUE:

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE TO JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS
ENTRY INTO THE RESIDENCE?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:
THE COURT OF APPEALS WILL NOT DISTURB THE TRIAL
COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS UNLESS THEY ARE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS, BUT THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
BASED UPON THOSE FINDINGS ARE REVIEWED ACCORDING
TO A NONDEFFERENTIAL CORRECTION OF ERROR STANDARD.

AUTHORITY:
STATE V.BEAVERS, 859 P.2D 9, 12 (UTAH APP. 1993)

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and to
what extent police officers are allowed to enter a private residence without a search
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warrant is determinative in this appeal. The Fourth Amendment reads as follows:
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or things t6o be seized." U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Brigham city appeals from an interlocutory order of the trial court granting
Defendants' Motion to Suppress Evidence. The trial court found that no
exigent circumstances existed to justify the officers' unwarranted entry
into the residence.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS:
The Defendants were arrested and charged with various minor
misdemeanors arising from an incident at a Brigham City residence. The
cases were filed into the First District Court of Utah, Brigham City
Department, in and for Box Elder County. These cases were assigned to
Judge Clint S. Judkins.
On Nov. 14, 2000, Defendants filed a Motion to Suppress, asserting that
the entry into the residence violated their rights against unreasonable
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search and seizure. On March 22, 2001, arguments were heard on the
motion.
DISPOSITION BELOW:
Judge Judkins granted Defendants' Motion to Suppress, finding that there
was no exigent circumstance to justify a warrantless search of the
residence.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 23,2000, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Brigham City police
received a call complaining about a loud party at 1074 Orchard St. in Brigham city, and
officers were dispatched. Upon their arrival, the officers determined that no one was in
the front part of the house and the noises and loud voices were emanating from the rear.
They declined to knock on the front door, citing concerns for their safety, and went
around the house down the driveway to the backyard where there was a six-foot privacy
fence around the yard. The officers testified that they saw two minors in the backyard
consuming alcohol. (At this point there was a serious question as to whether the officer
meant he saw what appeared to be two minors apparently consuming what appeared to be
alcohol—for generally one must verify a person's age and investigate the contents of a
container to know for sure, but the officer was adamant that the look through the slats of
the privacy fence was enough for him to be certain.) The officers also testified that the
two persons in the back yard said, "Oh, he's just had too much beer," apparently in
reference to the noise coming from inside the house. They then entered the back yard
through the closed gate. Subsequently they observed through the kitchen window four
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adults restraining and trying to calm another youth. The officer testified he saw the
youth free a hand and strike one of the adults. There was a great deal of yelling and
struggling and the officer testified that the person whom he saw get hit was at the sink,
rinsing the blood out of his mouth with water whereupon on officer opened the door,
stepped in, and announced his presence. When no one paid attention to him, he stepped
in front of the adults and more forcefully announced his presence. He then testifies that it
still took a lengthy period of time for anyone to acknowledge him.
The officers arrested the three juveniles, releasing one to his parents, and
five adults (one had been in bed asleep at the time).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Warrantless searches of a private residence arc per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions. Proving that a warrantless entry into a home falls within the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is a particularly heavy
burden that the prosecution must bear. There must be a showing of both probable cause,
which is what the police would have to show to get a warrant, and an exigency that
demanded immediate action such that it outweighs the protection afforded by the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. What it is that would constitute probable cause
to search the house in this case was never articulated by the prosecution, nor has it been
in Appellant's brief. Likewise, why the trial court's findings demand a concurrent
finding of exigent circumstances has never been explained.
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ARGUMENT

THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT DO NOT PRECLUDE A
FINDING THAT NO EXIGENCY EXISTED
The trial court did find that there was an altercation ongoing within the house, and
that one adult had been "smacked in the nose" by a juvenile. At the same time, the trial
court, recognizing the serious protection afforded by the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, found, in paragraph 5 of the Order on Motion to Suppress, no
exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the officer's entry into the residence.
(Emphasis added.) These are not inconsistent. Not every "exigent circumstance" can
justify a warrantless search. Mincey v. Arizona 437 U.S. 385, 394-395. Indeed, the cases
upon which the prosecution relies for their "emergency exception" exigency are not at all
similar to the instant case. In Pursifull, the police were responding to a call that there
was a gunshot victim and arrived at the home to find a mortally wounded man receiving
emergency medical attention in the driveway, and a trail of blood to and from the front
door. This justified a warrantless search of the home for additional victims, but only for
that purpose. Similarly in Mincy, an undercover agent had been killed in a drug bust and
the residence was searched for additional victims. Anything additional required a
warrant. In the instant case, the officer said he saw a person whose "injury" required that
he stand at the kitchen sink to rinse some blood off. There is no explanation as to how
that would give rise to a reasonable belief that the person was in need of "immediate
assistance."
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EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING A WARRANTLESS ENTRY DID NOT
EXIST

A. WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO A PRIVATE DWELLING IS AN
EXTREME MEASURE AND REQUIRES EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES
FOR ITS JUSTIFICATION.
The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a
person's home, whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948). As a matter of fact, the physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the Fourth Amendment is directed. United States
v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297,313 (1972). For this reason
warrantless searches and seizures within a home are per se unreasonable
absent exigent circumstances, and any exception to the warrant
requirement must fall within one of a carefully defined class of cases,
which are specifically established and well-delineated. United States v.
Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1567 (10th Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531,
534 (10th Cir. 1994). For this reason, the Prosecution "bears the
particularly heavy burden of proving the warrantless entry into a home
falls within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement." State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9,13 (Utah App. 1993); Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-750. Even if the Prosecution could meet
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that "particularly heavy burden" and show that the facts of this case fall
within one of the few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions to the warrant requirement that have been recognized, they
must also show that probable cause existed. State v. Beavers, 14. Since
the Fourth Amendment always requires probable cause as a basis for entry
into a private residence, even when exigent circumstances exist, the end
result is that there must be a showing that the officers had the requisite
probable cause and could have gotten a warrant, but that the exigent
circumstances which existed necessitated immediate action, and the need
for that action was compelling enough to outweigh the privacy interest
which is jealously guarded by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.
B. THE CIRCUMSTANCES UPON WHICH THE PROSECUTION
RELIES AS "EXIGENT' ARE NOT SO RECOGNIZED FOR THE
PURPOSES OF JUSTIFYING AN EXCEPTION TO THE
REQUIREMENT OF A WARRANT FOR ENTRY INTO A HOME
UNDER THE LAW.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the "application of the
exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should
rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a
minor offense.. .has been committed." State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9,
14(footnote 6) (Utah App. 1993) quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
740, 753. The "minor offense" to which the Supreme Court refers in
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Welsh is DUI. The Utah Court of Appeals correctly points out that DUI is
an offense that is hardly minor in an absolute sense. DUI is directly
responsible for a staggering death toll each year and a far greater number
of personal injuries and an immense amount of property damage. In this
regard it has to be considered far more serious an offense than anything
with which these defendants have been charged. Yet in the context of
comparing it to the sanctity of a person's home and the protection afforded
by the Constitution to the privacy interest therein, it is a minor offense, and
the exigent circumstances exception to the prohibition against warrantless
entry does not apply. How much more does the term "minor" apply to the
offenses with which these Defendants have been charged?
Warrantless entries are justified with probable cause and exigent
circumstances because in such circumstances, the delay to obtain a search
warrant would risk "physical harm to the officers or other persons, the
destruction of relevant evidence, or the escape of the suspect." Beavers,
quoting United States v. Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1989). There
is no basis to believe that the officers needed to enter the house to prevent
harm to themselves. Interestingly enough, the officers do not indicate that
the entry was made to prevent harm to anyone else, either. Their claim is
that they tried to get the attention of the occupants and took the youth into
custody after determining that he was intoxicated. The only threat of harm
that has ever been alleged was that one adult male had been punched by
the youth. When the officers entered the house, the adult and the youth
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were already separated, and there was no longer any threat of harm to
anyone, if ever there was. The officers' actions belie any concern for
injury. They did not offer any medical attention to anyone nor did they
check to see if any was needed. If the officer's testimony is to be
believed, the most that can be said is that one adult had suffered an injury
so minor that all that was required to take care of it was rinsing his mouth
out with water. By the time they entered the house he was already out of
harm's way. No weapons were observed; there was no search done for
any. There was no claim that any one was in imminent danger of injury,
let alone serious injury. 'The need to protect or preserve life or avoid
serious injury is sufficient justification for what would be otherwise illegal
absent an exigency or emergency." Wayne v. United States, 115 U.S.
App.D.C.234,241.
THE POLICE PRESENCE IN THE BACK YARD WAS AN UNLAWFUL
INTRUSION.
The expectation of privacy held by the owners of this private property and
their guests extended to the back yard. It was not a public place, neither was it
open, especially at that time of day. The yard was fenced and gated. Since they
were out on a call of a "loud party," they should have knocked on the front door
and /or rang the doorbell to get someone's attention and ask whatever questions
were necessary to make sure the situation was under control. There was no
probable cause justifying entry into the back yard. Even if they could have seen
the two persons that were in the back yard at the time, that which they saw could
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only give rise to some reasonable suspicion, not probable cause for entry onto
private property. Absent that intrusion, there could be no reason to claim any
knowledge of any situation that could possibly give rise to probable cause or
exigent circumstances.

CONCLUSION

To justify the warrantless entry into a private residence, the Prosecution
bears a very heavy burden. They must show that the police had probable cause such that
it would have supported the issuance of a search warrant and they also must show that
there was some exigent circumstance present creating such an emergency that they
needed to act immediately, and that need was so compelling as to override the general
rule that all searches and seizures in a private residence require a warrant issued by a
neutral judge. For this reason the claims of probable cause and exigent circumstance are
not measured by what the officers in the field subjectively thought was reasonable at the
time, it is absolutely an objective standard.
Even if this Court were to do so, the exception to the rule requiring a warrant
would not apply, for the underlying offenses are minor. We urge this Court to affirm the
decision of the trial court below.
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